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I. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. Jackson Hop May Recover Prejudgment Interest Even Though Prejudgment 
Interest was Not Included In The Arbitration Award. 
Fann Bureau argues that the holdings of Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Insurance Service Co. of 
Idaho, 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168 (1996) and Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 
145 Idaho 6, 175 P.3d 168 (2007) control the subject issue that prejudgment interest must be 
brought and decided in arbitration. It is undisputed that Wolfe and Cranney hold the foregoing 
proposition, however, the proposition is not absolute and an exception to the rule of law is 
created by statute cited by both cases. 
Idaho Code § 7-910 states: 
Fees and expenses of arbitration. - Unless otherwise provided in the agreement 
to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not 
including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as 
provided in the award. (Emphasis added). 
Fann Bureau argues that the statutory language of "unless otherwise provided" is 
intended to mean that the agreement to arbitrate must expressly prohibit the arbitration panel 
from considering prejudgment interest. In other words, the arbitration agreement's silence on the 
issue of prejudgment interest does not prohibit the arbitration panel from considering the issue. 
However, Fann Bureau's argument fails on two fronts. First, the express language in the 
arbitration provision in the policy sets forth the authority and issues an arbitration panel can 
decide. In the instant case, the arbitration provision states, in relevant part: 
Arbitration. This paragraph does not apply to liability coverages, or uninsured 
or underinsured motorist coverages. An insured or we may make a written 
demand for arbitration to determine all disputed issues as to (1) whether an 
insured is entitled under the policy to coverage for a loss, or (2) the value of a loss 
to real or personal property where coverage is not disputed. . . . (Emphasis 
added). 1 
1 See R., Vol 2, p. 122. 
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In interpreting an arbitration clause, the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following in 
Lovey v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 46, 72 P.3d 877, _ (2003): 
Whether an arbitration clause in a contract requires arbitration of a particular 
dispute or claim depends upon its terms. When construing a contract, a court 
must first decide whether it is ambiguous, which is a question oflaw. (Citation 
omitted). A contractual provision will be found ambiguous if it is reasonably 
subject to conflicting interpretations. (Citation omitted). Because the arbitration 
clause at issue does not appear ambiguous on its face, nor has either party asserted 
that it contains an ambiguity, this Court exercises free review over its 
interpretation. (Citation omitted). Interpretation of an unambiguous document is 
a question of law. (Citation omitted). The meaning of an unambiguous contract 
and the intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the 
words. (Citation omitted). 
In the instant case, the arbitration clause outlines two (2) specific issues the 
arbitration panel has the authority to only decide. In question, is the second issue which 
states "the value of a loss to real or personal property where coverage is not disputed." 
Breaking down the foregoing authority in this case, the "real or personal property" 
covered by the insurance policy was the buildings, fixtures and equipment. The "loss" is 
the damages. And finally, the "value" is measuring the amount of damages which the 
policy provided was measured "at actual cash value at the time of the loss but not 
exceeding the amount necessary to repair or replace. "2 The actual cash value of the 
buildings, equipment and fixtures did not include prejudgment interest. The issue of 
an award of prejudgment interest is a question of law. The purpose of an award of 
prejudgment interest is "to fully compensate an injured party from the loss of use of 
their money during the pend ency of this action." See, Dillon v. Montgomery, 13 8 
Idaho 614,617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003); see also, Ace Realty v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 
682 P.2d 1289 (App.1984). 
2 See, R., Vol. 2, p. 135. 
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According to the terms of the arbitration clause, the arbitration panel was only 
authorized to decide the actual cash value of the buildings, equipment and fixtures caused 
by the fire on the fire on September 16, 2012.3 Thus, the exception that"[ ]nless 
otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate" provided under Idaho Code § 7-910 is 
applicable rendering the Wolfe and Cranney holdings inapplicable in this case. 
In Ferrell v. United Financial Casualty Co., 155 Idaho 85,305 .3d 529 (2013), 
the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of costs on the grounds that 
the arbitration clause in the case clearly expressed that each party was to bear its O\Vn 
costs. 
In this case, the loss of use of Jackson Hop's money was because Farm Bureau 
failed to tender the amount it was justly due under the policy. Obviously, had the 
arbitration panel found Farm Bureau's opinions persuasive and found the amount Farm 
Bureau tendered to be the amount justly due, prejudgment interest would be a moot issue. 
Secondly, the parties agreed and stipulated to stay the judicial proceedings pending the 
arbitration and continuing to reserve jurisdiction with the Court to resolve any legal issues that 
the arbitration panel did not resolve which was entered by Court Order on July 24, 2013 which 
stated: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court will continue to have jurisdiction over 
the above entitled litigation and that further proceedings shall be stayed until the 
arbitration has been completed, except to the extent that either party seeks this 
Court's intervention to resolve any legal issues that the arbitration panel 
does not resolve. (Emphasis added). 
In Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 633-34, 888 P.2d 804, 807-08 (App.1995), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
3 See, R. VoL 2, pp. 355-356. 
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Oral stipulations of the parties in the presence of the court are generally held to be 
binding, especially when acted upon or entered on the court records, and need not 
be signed by the parties or their attorneys. 73 AM.JUR.2D Stipulations§ 3, at 
page 537 (1974). The validity of a stipulation or agreement between counsel 
regarding matters before the court is predicated upon both parties' agreement to 
its terms. (Citation omitted). An attempted stipulation is ineffective when it is 
clear from the record that the parties never assented to it (Citations omitted). 
The executed stipulation and Order entered by the Courton July 24, 2013 was further 
indication by the parties agreeing that the arbitration panel was not to decide legal issues 
including but not limited to the issue of attorney fees, costs and prejudgment interest at the 
arbitration proceeding rendering the Wolfe and Cranney holdings inapplicable. 
It is presumed that the Idaho Legislature understood the meaning and purpose of the 
language in Idaho Code § 7-910 when it was enacted. Appellant is unaware of any Idaho 
Appellate Court case which has specifically defined the exception provided under Idaho Code§ 
7-910. In construing and interpreting a statute, the Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
This Court has consistently adhered to the primary canon of statutory construction 
that where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent 
of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction. 
(Citation omitted). Moreover, unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, 
ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute. 
(Citation omitted). In construing a statute, this Court will not deal in any subtle 
refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose and 
intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending 
substance and meaning to the provisions. (Citation omitted). 
Ada County v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425,428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993) 
(Emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the exception in Idaho Code§ 7-910 must have meaning and if the 
parties voluntarily agree that the court can resolve legal issues such as prejudgment 
interest then an award of prejudgment interest is not a modification of an arbitration 
award under Idaho Code§§ 7-912 and 7-913, but a separate judgment akin to an award of 
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attorney fees under Idaho Code § 41-1839 distinguishing the Cranney holding in this 
case. 
Based on the foregoing facts, case law and arguments, Jackson Hop respectfully 
requests this Court find that the exception to Idaho Code § 7-910 was applicable 
rendering the Wolfe and Cranney holdings inapplicable in this case. 
B. The Exception To The General Rule Of Law That Preiudgment Interest Can 
Only Be Awarded If The Damages Are Liquidated Or Capable Of Mathematical 
Computation In First Party Insurance Cases Should Be Affirmed. 
Farm Bureau argues that it is manifestly unfair to treat first party insurance policy cases 
differently from other contract cases in the prejudgment interest context Farm Bureau goes on 
to say that "[T]here is no rational basis in the law to carve out an exception for first-party 
insurance or place first-party insurance cases into a separate category for purposes of 
determining whether an award of prejudgment interest is authorized." Respondent's Brief, p. 20. 
Farm Bureau's incentive and motive for the Court to adopt a bright line and absolute rule 
requiring all contract cases to follow the general rule first announced in Barrett v. N Pac. Ry. 
Co., 29 ldaho 139, 157 P. 1016 (1996) and its progeny is that such a rule would effectively 
immunize and eliminate any award of prejudgment interest for any claim with automobile and/or 
property casualty insurance companies in first party claims. Thus allowing insurance companies 
to withhold amounts justly due from its insured without consequence and fully compensating its 
insured for the loss of use of their money during the pendency of any action should they prove 
and prevail that they did not receive the amount justly due. 
In the case at hand, it was undisputed that Jackson Hop's buildings, equipment and 
fixtures were rendered a total loss as a result of fire. Jackson Hop's insured the property with 
Farm Bureau for policy limits of $1,600,000. Per the terms of the policy, Jackson Hop submitted 
its proof of loss to recover the damages for the loss which Farm Bureau was paid to assume the 
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risk. Thereafter, Farm Bureau retained MAI appraiser, Joe Corlett to value the loss based on the 
method of actual cash value as stated in the policy. Mr. Corlett retained Joe H. Smith to assist 
him and appraise the actual cash value of the equipment. 
Rather than conducting a thorough investigation and understanding of the meaning of 
actual cash value, he elected to utilize as his basis, a definition of actual cash value discovered on 
an internet website called Investopedia, a non-authoritative source in the appraisal practice and 
industry.4 Without conducting much research and investigation of the hop industry, Mr. Corlett 
elected to utilize a tobacco barn building as a comparable to prepare a cost estimate of the 
buildings lost A tobacco barn building and hop drying buildings are not comparable. 
Accordingly, Mr. Corlett appraised the buildings and rendered an actual cash value opinion of 
$295,000. 
Mr. Smith, who was assigned to appraise the equipment, had one conversation with 
Nathan Jackson, son of Jerry Jackson, the majority owner, to reconstruct the equipment and 
fixtures that existed in the buildings. Despite Nathan Jackson's uncertainty, Mr. Smith never 
made an attempt to contact Jerry Jackson to confirm or corroborate the information received in 
order to formulate his opinion of value of $85,909. It is noted by Farm Bureau that only after the 
depositions of Jerry Jackson and Nathan Jackson did Farm Bureau receive additional information 
for Mr. Smith to prepare an addendum to his report, increasing his opinion from $85,909 to 
$133,000. Respondent's Brief, p. 6. Jackson Hops disputes that assertion. 
Based on Mr. Corlett's appraisal report, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop the total sum of 
$380,909 for the amount justly due. 
Jackson Hop disagreed with Farm Bureau's assessment of the amount justly due and 
retained its own appraiser, James More, George Merten, a general contractor who had personal 
4 See, R., Vol. 2, p. 168. 
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knowledge of the equipment and fixtures in place when Jackson Hop purchased the property and 
who specializes in the construction of the such equipment and fixtures and West Valley 
Construction who prepared a cost estimate to reproduce the buildings lost in the fire. 
Mr. More's assignment was to conduct an actual cash value appraisal, however, actual 
cash value was not a term or methodology defined or recognized in the Dictionary of Real Estate 
or Appraisal of Real Estate which are leading treatises in the appraisal industry. Performing his 
due diligence, Mr. More's research discovered the Idaho case, Manduca Datsun, Inc. v. 
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 163,676 P.2d 1274 (Ct.App.1984) which defined 
the term and accordingly applied the case law to the scope of his appraisal. 
Mr. More used and considered the information provided, in addition to conducting his 
own independent investigation, which included but was not limited to viewing other hop drying 
facilities in Wilder, Idaho (which there are only 4 others in Canyon County which Farm Bureau 
insures them all), talked with those hop owners and operators and contacted and spoke with 
Mary Jane Craigen, senior Vice President with Wells Fargo Insurance Services USA in Yakima, 
Washington who specializes in insuring hop industry improvements. 5 After considering all the 
information provided and gathered, Mr. More arrived at a combined actual cash value opinion of 
$1,410,000 for the buildings and equipment 
Jackson Hop provided all of this information to Farm Bureau to review and reconsider its 
initial tender. Importantly, this was the same information that was provided to and considered by 
its expert witnesses for their opinions in arbitration. Farm Bureau requested Mr. Corlett to 
provide an appraisal review of Mr. More's appraisal. 
On April 30, 2013, Mr. Corlett submitted his appraisal report criticizing Mr. More's 
5 See, R., Vol. 2, p. 235. 
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opinion and the basis in which he applied to arrive at his opinion.6 In conclusion, Mr. Corlett 
wrote: 
It is therefore the reviewer's conclusion that the appraisal under review presents 
an unrealistically high opinion of the actual cash value of the subject property 
even though they refer to it as the as is replacement value subject to the 
extraordinary conditions. It is therefore recommended by the reviewer that the 
client engage an independent contractor that is capable of estimating a reasonable 
reproduction cost of the hop drying facility. (Emphasis added).7 
Despite receiving Mr. Corlett's recommendation, Farm Bureau declined to comply and 
further declined to tender any additional amount. Respondent's Brief, p. 4. 
As a result of Farm Bureau's unwillingness to negotiate, Jackson Hop filed its lawsuit. 
The parties stipulated and the case was submitted to arbitration. A scheduling conference was 
held with the arbitration panel and counsel to schedule deadlines for discovery and expert 
witness disclosures. It was agreed that each party would simultaneously disclosed their expert 
witnesses and opinions, as well as rebuttal opinions, on specific dates. 
Jackson Hop disclosed the opinions of appraisers, Mark Richey and Mr. More, Jerry 
Jackson, as ovvner, Brian Smith, engineer, and general contractors, Richard Evans and George 
Merten. In response, Farm Bureau disclosed the initial appraisal report submitted by Mr. Corlett 
and Mr. Smith, no other opinions of value or costs were provided. 8 
In rebuttal, Farm Bureau disclosed the opinions of the probable construction costs of 
CSHQA, an amended opinion of Mr. Corlett raising his opinion from $295,000 to $300,000, a 
new opinion from Mr. Smith on the ACV of the buildings at $333,239, and his amended opinion 
on the equipment and fixtures from $85,909 to $133,000. Based on the foregoing new opinions, 
Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop an additional sum of $85,330, raising the total amount paid to 
6 See, R., Vol. 2, pp. 239-243. 
7 See id., p. 243. 
8 The appraisal report provided in the disclosures was the same appraisal report Jackson Hops received prior to filing 
the lawsuit and the one relied upon by Fann Bureau to pay the original tender. See, R., Vol. 2, pp. 161-191. 
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$466,239. The additional sum was paid approximately three (3) weeks before the arbitration 
hearing. 
Jackson Hop's experts' opinions on the actual cash value of the buildings ranged from 
$800,000 to $1,120,000 and for the equipment, their opinions ranged from $378,108 to 
$399,000. 
After considering all of the testimony and evidence, the arbitration panel entered its 
award and concluded that the actual cash value of the buildings was $740,000 and $315,000 for 
the equipment In reaching its decision, the arbitration panel noted that it did not find Farm 
Bureau's expert witnesses credible or knowledgeable on the issues. The arbitration awards for 
the buildings and equipment were more than double Farm Bureau's highest opinions of value for 
each. 
In the context of real and personal property claims, the measure of damages depends on 
the language of the policy. Standards for measuring property damages claims, include but are 
not limited to, fair market value, replacement cost less depreciation, repair cost, cost approach, 
income approach or actual cash value as in this case. Regardless of the particular standard 
utilized in measuring the damages, they are all subject to mathematical calculation. Despite the 
fact that all the methods for measuring property damage claims are subject to a formula and 
mathematical calculation, the issue arises from the data, information and discretion one relies 
upon to arrive at an opinion. 
Under any method the property damages are computed, it requires the rendering of an 
opinion from a qualified individual or expert whose opinion of damages may vary from another 
qualified individual or expert. Notwithstanding, simply because one opinion varies from another 
does not render the issue incapable of ascertainment by mathematical computation. 
Farm Bureau contends and relies upon several Idaho cases which have held that 
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prejudgment interest is inappropriate where disputes over the value of property are concerned, 
especially where discretion is exercised or opinions of experts must be relied upon to determine 
the value. Respondent's Brief, p. 21. It should be noted that none of the cases cited and relied 
on involve a first party insurance claim dealing with the issue of the amount justly due to its 
insured under the policy. 
Farm Bureau acknowledges that Idaho cases has treated first party insurance cases 
differently for purposes of prejudgment interest and did not require damages to be liquidated or 
mathematically computable to be awarded the same. Respondent's Brief, p. 19. However, it 
contends that this Court has called into question the soundness of this principle, referring to the 
special concurrences of Justice Eismann and Justice Warren Jones in the UIM cases of 
Greenough v. Farm Bureau 1\llutual Insurance Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 
(2006) and Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 145 Idaho 6, 9, 175 P.3d] 68, 171 
(2007), respectively. 
Jackson Hop appreciates the concerns of the Justices, but merely comments that the cases 
cited in the special concurrence in Greenough did not include the first party insurances cases that 
both parties have cited and discussed in their respective briefs on appeal. With respect to the 
special concurrence in Cranney, it should be noted that concerns of future expenses are generally 
known and provided to the insurance company through the proof of loss prior to any legal action 
that may ensue. As stated in Brinkman v. Aid Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 
1227, 1230-31 (1988): 
The purpose of a provision for notice and proofs of loss is to allow the insurer to 
form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities, to afford it an opportunity 
for investigation, and to prevent fraud and imposition upon it (Citation omitted). 
The purpose of proof of loss statements, in general, is to furnish the insurer 
with the particulars of the loss and all data necessary to determine its 
liability and the amount thereof, if any. (Emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, future expenses that may arise in a UIM case are known by the insurance 
company to assess its risk and determine how it should proceed. Clearly, claims for future 
expenses unknown to the insurance company, but arise in a legal action or arbitration effects the 
ability of the insured to collect their legal expenses such as attorney fees and costs. 
However, in the instant case, the concerns in the special concurrences are not similar as 
they may be in UIM cases because in the instant case there were no future expenses at issue, only 
the actual cash value of the buildings, equipment and fixtures that were destroyed in the fire on 
September 16, 2012. The value of the loss was set as of the date of the fire and the amount was 
liquidated subject to the policy limits of $1,600,000 which the parties contractually agreed to set 
and assume. 9 
Farm Bureau challenges the factual similarities in Dillon v. Montgomery. 138 Idaho 614, 
617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003) from the case at hand, referencing two paragraphs in the decision 
which "prove how dissimilar the facts of that case are from those at issue in the present matter." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 24. 
According to the Dillon paragraphs cited, the method of determining the value of the 
dealership was established by contract. The same is true in this matter as the policy expressed 
the method of value was based on the actual cash value at the time of the loss. 
Next, the Court noted that Montgomery breached the contract in several ways by failing 
to use the appropriate method for establishing the used inventory, failing to follow the contract's 
method for resolving the parties' differences and making every effort to thwart Dillon's efforts to 
resolve the problems. 
Here, Farm Bureau's actions are parallel to the Court's findings when it clearly failed to 
9 The policy contained a provision designated as "Limit of Liability" which specifically set forth the most the policy 
would pay for a loss was the amount of the policy limits which covered the particular loss. See, R., Vol. 2, p. 135. 
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pay Jackson Hop the amount it was justly due. Similar to the Court's comments, Farm Bureau 
failed to use the appropriate method for establishing actual cash value. As stated above, its 
expert relied on a definition discovered on an internet website that was not an authoritative 
source in the appraisal practice nor the legal definition held under Idaho case law. The 
arbitration panel, itself, stated that it did not accept Farm Bureau's selected appraiser's 
calculations for depreciation expressing, "[T]he panel did not accept the calculations on 
depreciation selected by the appraiser for the respondent; he candidly admitted that his figure 
was a forced number to get to a final value that was within the original purchase price - which 
the panel did not find to be a valid limiting factor." 10 
Similarly, Farm Bureau made every effort to thwart Jackson Hop's effort to resolve the 
dispute. As expressed above, Jackson Hop's provided Farm Bureau the same information that 
was provided in arbitration before the lawsuit was commenced. Farm Bureau chose not to 
consider the information. Furthermore, its selected appraiser recommended that it engage an 
independent contractor to prepare a reasonable estimate for the reproduction of the hop facility 
which it refused to follow the recommendation and instead force Jackson Hop to file its lawsuit 
to recover the amount justly due. 
As the Dillon Court expressed, Montgomery should not have been able to avoid 
prejudgment interest by simply breaching the contract and then arguing the value was to be 
determined by the Court. Here, Farm Bureau is making the same argument as Montgomery in 
that it disputed Jackson Hop's assessment and would leave it up to the arbitration panel to decide 
the amount that was justly due. 
Several other facts in Dillon, supra., are similar to the facts in the instant matter. In 
Dillon, supra., the parties' appraisals differed in value for the used vehicle inventory and the 
10 See, R., Vol. 3, p. 357. (Emphasis added). 
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accountants could not agree on the other's number. See id., 138 Idaho at 616, 67 P.3d at 95. In 
the instant case, Jackson Hop and Farm Bureau's appraisers had differing actual cash value 
opinions for the buildings, equipment and fixtures. 
The Dillon contract amount was liquidated to the extent that if the amount of the closing 
date holdback was less than $800,000, Dillon would pay the difference between the closing date 
holdback amount and the $800,000. However, if the amount exceeded $800,000 then 
Montgomery paid the difference. 
Here, Jackson Hop insured the buildings, equipment and fixtures for $1,600,000. The 
policy specifically expressed that Farm Bureau would pay no more than the policy limit for the 
property: 
3. Limit of Liability. Subject to the provisions of this policy, the most we will 
pay for loss or damage from any occurrence is the applicable limit of liabilitv 
stated in the Declarations, in the policy booklet, or in any applicable 
endorsement. 11 (Emphasis Added). 
In Dillon, Montgomery's refusal to follow the contract caused Dillon to seek further 
relief from the district court. The same was true in this matter. 
In Dillon, the district court weighed the evidence and was able to determine the closing 
date net worth consistent with applicable legal standards. Here, the arbitration panel weighed the 
evidence and determined the actual cash value of the buildings, equipment and fixtures 
consistent with the legal definition of actual cash value as held under Idaho law. 
The Dillon Court held based on the facts and circumstances involved, the district court 
properly awarded Dillon prejudgment interest "in order to fully compensate an injured party for 
the loss of the use of their money during the pendency of the action." See id., 138 Idaho at 617, 
67 P.3d at 96. In light of the similar facts and circumstances involved herein with Dillon, this 
11 See, R., Vol.2,p.135. 
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Court should reverse the district court's denial of prejudgment interest and instruct the district 
court to award Jackson Hop prejudgment interest to fully compensate Jackson Hop the loss of 
the use of over $670,000 Farm Bureau improperly withheld to which Jackson Hop was justly due 
at the time of its loss. 
C. Jackson Hop May Recover Preiudgment Interest Because Farm Bureau Failed 
To Pay The Amount Jackson Hop Was Justly Due Under The Policy After It 
Furnished Its Proof Of Loss. 
Farm Bureau contends that Jackson Hop was not entitled to prejudgment interest under 
the terms of the policy until the arbitration award. Specifically, Farm Bureau cites to the 
provision in the policy which states that the loss payment will be made 60 days after it receives a 
sworn proof of loss and ascertainment of the loss is made by either an agreement by the parties, 
entry of a final judgment or filing of an arbitration award. 12 
Farm Bureau relies on the legal proposition cited in Greenough, supra., that holds in 
insurance cases, money becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance 
contract. See id., 142 Idaho at 293, 130 P.3d at 113 L However, in Greenough, based on a 
similar policy as in this matter, the Court stated as follows: 
In insurance cases money becomes due as provided under the express terms of the 
insurance contract. Therefore, the insured is not entitled to prejudgment interest 
until he or she complies with the applicable contract provisions. In the current 
case, the insurance policy stated that payment for loss would be made sixty 
days after Farm Bureau received a signed, sworn proof of loss. Therefore, 
the insurance money did not become due, and prejudgment interest did not 
begin to accrue, until sixty days after Greenough Jr. provided farm Bureau 
with a sufficient proof of loss. Id (Emphasis added). 
In the instant matter, after receipt of the signed, sworn proof of loss furnished by Jackson 
Hop on October 24, 2012, Farm Bureau paid $380,909 based on Mr. Corlett's appraisal report 
within the sixty days provided in the policy as the amount Jackson Hop was due. Jackson Hop 
12 See, R., Vol. 2, p. 123. 
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disagreed with Farm Bureau's assessment of the actual cash value of its property and challenged 
the amount tendered to it. Now, Farm Bureau claims that despite paying Jackson Hop what it 
deemed the amount owing, it argues that the amount paid was not really due for purposes of 
prejudgment interest until the arbitration award was made, 
However, Farm Bureau omits to recognize that several Idaho cases in the insurance 
context have held that prejudgment interest does not stop accruing because a payment was made, 
but continues to accrue on those sums not paid and found to be the amount justly due, See, 
Aviation Industries Inc. v. East and West Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn.. 70 Idaho 28,211 P2d 
156 (1949), see also. Brinkman. supra. 
To hold otherwise, would allow Farm Bureau to under pay its insured the amount justly 
due, forcing its insured to take action to recover the amount justly due and eliminate an award of 
prejudgment interest to fully compensate the insured for the loss of use of their money during the 
pendency of the action, but yet Farm Bureau, as the paid surety, would continue to generate 
income on the sums \\-TOngfully withheld which belonged to its insured. 
Accordingly, Jackson Hop was entitled to prejudgment interest on those sums found to be 
justly due that were not tendered after furnishing its signed, sworn proof of loss. 
D. Farm Bureau Is Not Entitled To Attorney's Fees On Appeal. 
Farm Bureau asserts that it should be awarded its attorney' fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code §41-1839 on the grounds that Jackson Hop brought this appeal frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Specifically, it contends that the law in Idaho is settled that 
an award of prejudgment interest must be brought through the arbitration. However, as 
explained above, Idaho Code§ 7-910 provides an exception to the general rule which according 
to the parties' agreement to arbitrate applied to limit the authority of the arbitration panel to 
simply determining the actual cash value of the buildings, equipment and fixtures, thus rendering 
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the holdings in Wolfe, supra. and Cranney, supra., inapplicable in this matter. 
Furthermore, Farm Bureau acknowledged that Idaho case law has treated insurance 
contracts differently from other contracts in the context of an award of prejudgment interest, 
therefore supporting Jackson Hop's reasoning for pursuing the instant appeal, as reasonable and 
with foundation. 
Based on the facts, arguments and case law presented in this appeal, Jackson Hop 
respectfully requests that Farm Bureau be denied its attorney's fees and costs in this appeal. 
E. Jackson Hop Is Entitled to Attorney's Fees On Appeal. 
Farm Bureau argues that Jackson Hop is not entitled to its attorney's fees for pursuing 
this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839 asserting that in the instant appeal, the amount 
justly due is not in dispute, but instead whether Jackson Hop was entitled to an award of 
prejudgment interest on the difference between the amount paid versus the arbitration award. 
Farm Bureau's argument is premised on semantics in that prejudgment interest is but a factor in 
determining the amount justly due to Jackson Hop. 
It is undisputed that the arbitration panel's arbitration award was limited to only 
determining the actual cash value of the buildings, equipment and fixtures in which it rendered 
its decision. As a result of the significant disparity between the amount paid by Farm Bureau 
versus the amount ultimately determined to be the actual cash value of the property lost in the 
fire, the sum Farm Bureau withheld from Jackson Hop is the amount that accrues prejudgment 
interest, not the amount originally tendered. 
Jackson Hop has previously calculated the prejudgment interest that has accrued on the 
unpaid sums, providing Farm Bureau credit on all sums paid during the pendency of the action 
until paid. 
This issue on appeal is part of and arises from the ultimate issue raised in the Complaint 
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which Farm Bureau failed to paid the amount justly due to Jackson Hop under its policy. 
Accordingly, Jackson Hop respectfully requests an award of its attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 for reasonably and with foundation in pursuing this appeal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
According to the holding in Intermountain Association of Credit Men v. Milwaukee 
Mechanic's Insurance Company, 44 Idaho 491,258 P. 362 (1927) and the legal proposition 
followed in other Idaho cases involving first party insurance claims, the Court should affirm this 
exception to the general rule in the limited context of first party insurance claims. 
The policy considerations are the same as they are for the purpose of Idaho Code § 41-
1839 in that the payment of prejudgment interest on sums not tendered would not amount to a 
penalty, but rather provide just compensation to the insured for the loss of use of his money for 
bringing an action against his compensated insurer to recover what he was rightfully entitled and 
justly due. 
Based on the foregoing case law, statutory authority and arguments above, Jackson Hop 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's denial of prejudgment interest 
and remand the matter with instructions to award prejudgment interest as reflected in the record. 
In addition, Jackson Hop respectfully request an award of its attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in pursuing this appeal and denial for an award of attorney's fees and costs to Farm 
Bureau. 
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